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  • The Digital Golden Age &The World Beyond
     
    As every Trends subscriber knows, the majority of the worlds workforce is aging rapidly and labor force growth is slowing, except in India and Africa. US labor force growth, will slow to 0.4% per year in the 2020s. That major demographic shift is bringing an end to the abundance of labor that has fueled economic growth since the 1970s. Thanks to longer and healthier lives, many people are working well into their 70s and beyond, but the trend toward later retirement is not likely to fully offset the negative effects of aging populations.
     
    As the total size of the labor force stagnates or declines in many markets, the limitations on human capital could potentially reduce the momentum of economic growth. If it does, governments will face major challenges in dealing with surging healthcare costs, old-age pensions and high levels of debt. On the plus side, the lagging wages that faced middle and low-skilled workers in advanced economies since 2000 should rise due to the simple economics of greater demand and lesser supply. However, demographics is not the only force in motion.


    As we forecasted in Ride the Wave, the Deployment Phase of the Fifth Techno-Economic Revolution is expected to unleash an unprecedented and accelerating wave of automation based on AI, the IoT and service robotics. Faced with a rising scarcity of labor, companies and investors will increasingly depend on automation technologies to boost productivity.


    But to grow, economies need demand to match rising output. According to analysis by Bain & Company, automation could realistically push output potential far ahead of demand potential. For instance, the rapid spread of automation may eliminate as many as 20% to 25% of existing U. S. jobs?equivalent to 40 million displaced American workers, while depressing wage growth for many more workers.
     
    Bain expects that the largest share of the benefits from this automation will flow primarily to two groups: the owners of capital and the top 20% of workers who will remain highly-compensated and highly-skilled. In fact, the growing scarcity of highly-skilled workers could push their incomes even higher relative to lesser-skilled workers. As a result, automation has the potential to significantly increase income inequality and, by extension, wealth inequality.


    For countries entering the 2020s with a relatively low level of income inequality, where demand growth does not already constrain supply growth, the widening divide will be easier to manage. However, the two largest economies in the world?namely, the US and China?have levels of income inequality at or near their historic peaks and automation could further raise inequality.


    Bain expects a moderately rapid rollout over 10 to 20 years that would trigger a massive investment surge, estimated at an incremental $8 trillion in the US alone. Much of the added output potential would be directed toward meeting the investment demand associated with the transformation. This will push overall economic growth rates back up to the high levels last seen in the 1980s and 1990s.


    Importantly, rapid automation of the US service sector, could eliminate jobs two to three times more rapidly than in previous techno-economic revolutions. And, as this investment wave recedes in the 2030s, it may leave in its wake deeply unbalanced economies in which income is concentrated too heavily among those focused on saving and investing, rather than consuming.


    Under that scenario, growth after 2035 would become deeply ¡°demand constrained,¡± exposing the full magnitude of the labor market disruption that was temporarily hidden from view by the investment boom. Bain worries that, over time, the interplay of demography, automation, and inequality may produce a serious contradiction; specifically, a dramatic surge in output potential could ultimately leads to economic stagnation.
     
    What happens beyond that potential pivot is open to speculation. The Trends editors argue that the clear pattern of history is that creating more value with fewer resources has always led to rising material wealth and prosperity. And, there is no reason to believe that this time will be different, eventually.


    However, Bain¡¯s worries are primarily related to the pace. When the deployment phase of a techno-economic transition nears its end, there is typically a period of relatively stagnation, like we last saw in the 1970s. Since the time horizon for Bain¡¯s analysis stretches only into the early 2030s, 15 to 20 years from now, it does not fully reflect the slow-down that may occur as we wait for the next techno-economic revolution to accelerate.


    Relieving the imbalances causing the stagnation in that time-period would mean changing the pattern of income distribution somehow, ensuring that income flows toward those inclined to spend rather than save. Many options exist, and different countries will choose different paths. The risk comes from the fact that historically, governments confronted with serious economic imbalances have often opted for an active role in reshaping market-based outcomes. And the long-term results have not been good.
     
    Given these trends, we offer the following forecasts for your consideration.


    First, many middle-class markets will erode as the 60-40 economy persists through the 2020s.


    This is a function of the two-tiered economy that Ray Dalio talks about.We believe both will be better off than today, but the gap between them may grow. Customers struggling to afford goods aimed at the affluent will be increasingly receptive to lower-priced alternatives. This implies both the continued expansion of private-label goods and rising pressure on brand premiums for those that fail to clearly pick the upper or lower market. Cost models developed in emerging markets such as China and India will provide important lessons for companies competing for the broad lower tier. Emerging players with international ambitions may also find growing opportunities to sell "good enough" products and services to this tier. The rationale to automate will differ at the upper and lower tiers of the market. Premium goods manufacturers will tap automation technologies to offer upper-tier customers a better experience, higher customer intimacy and greater personalization. In short, companies will use technology to make their products even more premium. Companies producing goods for the lower tier of the market will use automation to bring down costs and align their offerings with the lower purchasing power of mid- and lower-income consumers. At this end of the spectrum, consumers are likely to be more willing to accept automation trade-offs such as self-ordering kiosks at fast food restaurants vs. a higher-priced, full-service dining experience or machine-based financial advisory services vs. a human financial adviser.


    Second, automation based on artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, and mobile computing will fuel a 10-to-15-year investment boom followed by a potential bust.


    The new research by Bain & Company confirms the ¡°digital golden age¡± described long ago in Trends and later in Ride the Wave.Theinvestment in new automation technologies over the next decade will follow the same pattern as all major capital investment waves. Typically, investment builds momentum gradually. Eventually, it peaks and then overshoots demand, leading to a cyclical bust. We expect the magnitude of investment in the coming decade to be greater in scale than in previous periods because it will affect almost every industry and sector. It will spread simultaneously through advanced economies as well as parts of the developing world.


    Third, for businesses, the early part of the coming investment wave will create four types of opportunities for companies, which managers and investors need to understand.


    1. Core platform providers will provide the essential ¡°enabling technologies¡± for this phase of automation. These are the main building blocks for more general automation technologies. We divide this group into the physical building blocks, such as high-dexterity robotic hands, and the analytical or control building blocks, such as machine learning systems and the application program interfaces that go with them.


    2. Systems integrators will combine the various building blocks to create functional systems ? for instance, a drone that can drop off packages ? by assembling various sophisticated hardware and software components to create one integrated package.


    3. Application developers are businesses that figure out how to take various automated systems and adapt them to discrete uses, such as delivering a package to a customers house. The bulk of innovation will likely be in augmenting or replacing existing products or services with automation. Breakthrough innovation focused on new uses rather than replacement functions could grow over time and eventually become the main focus of automated systems as overall capability continues to advance. And,


    4. Collateral infrastructure providers that enable new automation systems, which, according to Bain, may be nearly half the total investment that the next phase of automation will require. For example, a highly automated restaurant kitchen will generally require extensive remodeling to make the best use of automated food preparation systems. The new setup may require less floor space devoted to cooking and preparation, but it will need new electrical and track systems for robots. Systems will vary widely. Some will make use of vertical space?for instance, robotic prep chefs stacked vertically?but will also require modifications to existing appliances and storage.
     
    Fourth, investors involved in real estate and infrastructure will be impacted in unexpected ways by the pace of disruption due to automation.


    Automation has already contributed to shifting and declining demand for retail space, especially in places such as the US, Canada and the UK. Automation is also likely to lead to a drop in demand for office space, especially when it is tied to largely back-office functions that are more highly susceptible to automation (but also to customer-facing ones such as contact centers.) On the other hand, it is likely to further fuel the need for warehouse and logistics space, as well as increasing demand for small ¡°flex space¡± for manufacturing using highly automated factories. Similarly, we¡¯ll see rising investment in physical infrastructure, particularly in the electrical grid and telecommunications. Retail businesses will demand more electricity as automation enables more of them to remain open 24 hours and meet customers growing demand for always-on retail service. Highly automated businesses will also require improved service-level agreements and reliability guarantees similar to todays data centers. Utilities will be able to add new value-added services to a staid service mix. Automation will contribute to the declining cost of distance, triggering additional investment to deliver highly reliable power and telecommunications to lower-density developments along the furthest exurban edges of metropolitan areas. Notably, as robots replace humans by the millions, Bain says a shrinking workforce could create a temporary, multi-year lull in demand for commuter transit projects. Longer term, the increasing use of autonomous vehicles in transportation, including for long-haul trucking, will enable higher transit density across longer distances without congestion, reducing overall lane usage.
     
    Fifth, there will be an acute shortage of highly-skilled, high-income workers in the 2020s as investment in automation technologies takes off.


    Over time, workers will acquire new skills and migrate toward the jobs in demand. However, shifts of this nature take a considerable amount of time. -- Consider the highest-skilled and highest-paying jobs today, such as physicians, data architects, strategy managers, and research and development managers. These professions typically require at least four to eight years of tertiary education. To develop the skills and experience necessary for a midlevel or top position, graduates usually need 10 years of work experience. Even assuming that those making the upward migration from mid-skilled to highly-skilled roles had all the necessary education and started working toward that goal in the early 2020s, they would not be eligible to fill highly-skilled positions until nearly the start of the 2030s. More likely, the reskilling and retraining transition will require several decades, making the scarcity of highly-skilled workers a long-term challenge for employers. As competition grows for scarce talent, leading companies will invest more to attract, grow and retain scarcer high-end talent and ensure that their workforce is as productive as possible. To increase their allure, employers may enhance existing incentives with monetary benefits, culture and flexible work arrangements.
     
    Sixth, baby boomers will, remain an important pool of talent through at least 2030, when the youngest members of that generation will only be 66.


    Companies that seek to retain highly-skilled workers from the tail end of the boomer generation may need to adopt more flexible work arrangements, including shorter hours. In fact, as competition for talent increases, standard employment offers may disappear. The labor force of the 2020s and beyond will include four generations [boomers, xers, millennials, and Gen-Z]. Companies that offer identical packages to all four will be vulnerable to poaching from employers willing to make more focused offers. To secure top talent, employers are likely to offer different segments of the labor force a custom blend of compensation, benefits and hours.
     
    Seventh, for businesses and investors, labor scarcity at the high end and labor abundance among mid- to low-skilled workers will create an opportunity to support the migration of these workers toward new higher-skilled roles.
    Such efforts would likely receive support not only from talent-starved private employers but also from governmental entities looking for solutions to rising unemployment, stagnating wages and growing income inequality. One alternative is for-profit educational systems and corporate training programs. Another is new forms of professional certification similar to the Microsoft Certified Solutions Expert or Automotive Service Excellence programs for computer technicians and automotive technicians, respectively. By establishing objective and marketable credentials for the wide variety of service sector roles, these programs can improve the focus of training and increase labor market flexibility. For example, given the large percentage of the workforce employed in food service and retail, a certification program for a "master customer experience specialist" would create clear skill and performance measures to help employers screen candidates and allow certified workers to command a premium. We expect an increasingly merit-based system of immigration to help the United States address this crisis.
     
    Eighth, baby boomer spending growth will peak in the 2020s before tapering.


    Consistent with forecasts over 20 years ago by the Trends editors, Bain¡¯s research says, ¡±compared with previous generations, baby boomers will extend the period of high-income earning and spending by about 10 years.¡± The sheer size of this generation means there are considerable market opportunities for most goods and services, including big-ticket items such as housing and transportation. Spending growth based on this demographic shift will be most concentrated among the top 20% of households. Baby boomer spending in retirement years will reach its peak in the coming decade before beginning to taper off in the 2030s. While the actual peak of baby boomer spending has already passed (spending per household peaks when the head of household is in his or her mid-40s) the long transitional period of preretirement also marks a substantial shift in spending patterns. For example, homeownership rates peak 10 years later than they did in 1982; homeownership now peaks in the preretirement years (ages 55?74). In the US between 1984 and 2015, the growth in housing expenditures for pre-retirees was more than double that of those in their core productive and reproductive stage of life (ages 30?54). For homebuilders and businesses providing goods and services for the home, baby boomers will be a large consumer pool for years to come. Expenditures per household will also be higher among boomers vs. previous generations at the same age, thanks to the higher incomes of affluent boomers. Just as with many of the other trends, businesses will have to carefully assess the changing demographics and income patterns. Only about the top 20% of older households are likely to have enough savings to support a traditional retirement, while the bottom 40% have negligible retirement savings and may see their income and workforce participation decline due to health reasons. However, wealthier and older baby boomers will likely be willing to spend on an increasing array of convenience and support services that enable them to stay in their homes as they age. About the only major category of spending expected to decline for the baby boomer cohort as a whole is apparel. -- Toward the end of the 2020s, spending by boomers will start to abate. That shift may coincide with a decline in new automation investment. Therefore, businesses and investors need to be mindful of the potential flattening of demand growth toward the end of the decade, in combination with other risk factors that could start to emerge from other parts of the macroeconomic landscape. And,
     
    Ninth, as we enter the late 2020s and 2030s, retirees and the working-age population will battle for resources, potentially drawing in business as well as government.


    High income and wealth inequality may raise questions about how resources are divided between baby boomer retirees and working-age millennials. Public pension and healthcare systems may be stretched to the breaking point. The shrinking base of middle-class workers to tax to support the growing pool of transfer-dependent retirees will be insufficient to fully fund the needs of all non-affluent retirees. For businesses and investors, government transfers will be important because they¡¯ll drive rising or falling spending patterns and business opportunities; for example, increasing transfers to retirees will likely trigger greater spending by retirees. Businesses, management teams and even shareholders may be drawn into the conversation about government transfers as they grapple with existing pension obligations, the scarcity of highly skilled workers, social pressure to address job losses and declining incomes among mid- to low-skilled workers.


    References
    1. Karen Harris. Austin Kimson and Andrew Schwedel. Bain Report, February 07, 2018. Labor 2030: The Collision of Demographics, Automation and Inequality.

    http://s1.pulso.cl/wp-con-tent/uploads/2018/02/BAIN_REPORT_Labor_2030.pdf


    2. John Mauldin. Thoughts From the Frontline, March 11, 2018. The Great Jobs Collision.

    https://www.mauldineconomics.com/frontlinethoughts/the-great-jobs-collision