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References List :
1. McKinsey Quarterly, February 2015, "The $64 Trillion Question: Convergence in Asset Management," by Pooneh Baghai, Onur Erzan, and Ju-Hon Kwek. ¨Ï 2015 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved.
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/financial_services/the_64_trillion_question
2. iBid.
3. To learn more about the Strategic Wealth Advisor investment strategies, visit their website at:
http://www.strategicwealthadvisor.com
The Future of Money Management
As recently explained in the February 2015 McKinsey Quarterly, the boom in alternative investments presents something of a paradox. On the one hand, money has continued to pour into alternatives since 2010.1
Assets hit a record high of $7.2 trillion in 2013. The category more than doubled in size from 2005 to 2013, with global assets under management growing at an annualized pace of 10.7 percent; thats twice the rate of traditional investments.
Most notably, flows into alternatives were 6 percent of total assets in 2013, dwarfing the 1.5 percent of total assets that went into non-alternative investments. Every alternative asset category grew, especially direct hedge funds, real assets, and retail alternatives sold through registered vehicles, like mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs).
Even private equity, where assets had retreated from pre-crisis highs, has bounced back in its recent fundraising.
On the other hand, alternatives have enjoyed this growth at a time when their returns have generally lagged behind the broader market indexes. The average hedge fund, for instance, produced an 11 percent return in 2013, while the S&P 500 index soared by 30 percent, and our own Strategic Wealth Advisor strategies averaged a 43.5 percent gain.
Skeptics contend that, if returns stay sluggish, investor patience will wear thin and the alternatives boom will run out of steam. However, McKinseys new research clearly indicates that the boom is far from over. In fact, it has much more room to run.
In late 2013 and early 2014, McKinsey surveyed nearly 300 institutional investors managing $2.7 trillion in total assets and conducted more than fifty interviews with a cross-section of investors by size and type. At that time, the vast majority of institutional investors intended to either maintain or increase their allocations to alternatives through 2016.
Enthusiasm was especially high among sovereign-wealth funds, as well as large and small pension funds, but not mid-size funds. Wealthy individuals were also moving rapidly into the market, as new product vehicles provided retail investors with unprecedented access. McKinsey estimates that flows from each of these four groups could grow by more than 10 percent annually through 2019.
McKinsey also identified four secular trends among institutional investors favoring the growth of alternative investments relative to traditional investments:2
1. Disillusionment with traditional asset classes and products. An increasing number of investors are now using alternatives, particularly hedge funds, as a way to dampen portfolio volatility and generate a steady stream of returns. Demand for alternative credit products has been particularly strong, driven by challenges posed to "long-only strategies" in the current low rate environment.
2. Evolution in state-of-the-art portfolio construction. Many investors seek to complement the low-cost beta achieved through index strategies with the "diversified alpha" and "exotic beta" of alternatives. Further, some of the most sophisticated institutions are beginning to abandon traditional asset-class definitions and embrace risk-factor based methodologies.
3. Increased focus on specific investment outcomes. The shift from relative return benchmarks to concrete outcomes tied to specific investor needs has created a new tailwind for alternatives. For example hedge funds can help manage volatility.
4. A need to achieve beneficiaries high return expectations. Some defined-benefit pension plans have persistent asset-liability gaps and are assuming seemingly unrealistic rates of return in the range of 7 to 8 percent. Many of these plan sponsors are placing their faith in higher-yielding alternatives.
However, McKinsey research found that its the retail segment which is likely to be the primary driver of alternative asset growth, particularly in the United States. High-net-worth individuals, as well as "the mass affluent," are increasingly looking to hedge downside risk, protect principal, manage volatility, and generate income.
Access to alternative strategies is being democratized through product and packaging innovations within regulated mutual funds and ETFs. As a result, the broad category of "retail alternative assets" has grown by 16 percent annually since 2005, and now stands at almost $900 billion. This category includes commodities, long-short products, and market-neutral strategies in mutual fund, closed-end fund, and ETF formats.
"Hedge fund-like offerings" - structured as so-called "¡®40 Act funds" - have experienced particularly robust growth, as investors seek to balance their desire for exposure to new alternatives with the need for liquidity.
In light of this trend, what can we expect? We offer the following forecasts for your consideration:
First, over the next five years, the alternative investments business will grow dramatically in terms of market share, while remaining highly profitable.
Today, alternatives account for a disproportionate share of investment industry revenues, and McKinsey expects that this will continue. In 2013, alternatives accounted for about 12 percent of global industry assets, but generated one-third of the revenues. By 2020, alternatives will comprise about 15 percent of global industry assets, and produce up to 40 percent of industry revenues, as the category continues to siphon flows from traditional products.
Second, investment fees for alternatives will remain high, even as traditional actively managed investment products face the growing threat of commoditization and margin compression.
Eighty percent of institutional investors surveyed by McKinsey expect the management fees they pay hedge funds over the next three years will either remain at current levels or, in a small number of cases, increase.
Few expect performance fees to fall, though about half expect to see structural changes to improve incentive alignment between managers and their investors. For example, many expect a move from simple high-water marks to a greater use of claw-backs. Healthy revenue yields should also hold up in the retail segment. Compared with ETFs and target-date funds, alternatives command a significantly higher revenue margin - more than two times greater than target-date funds and four times greater than ETFs.
Third, large institutional investors will use alternative investments differently from the way small institutions and retail investors use them.
Large investors McKinsey surveyed indicated a desire to take greater control over their alternative investing activities. These large, sophisticated institutions are frequently leaning toward specialist boutiques (rather than large, generalist managers) for their ability to deliver unique capabilities and customized exposures, often in the form of separate accounts. For smaller institutional investors, with less than $2 billion in assets under management, the highest priority is to secure access to quality investments and managers. Alternatives add a level of complexity to the investment and risk-management processes, driving these institutions appetite for outsourced services and solutions with embedded advice, including multi-alternative products, funds of funds, and managed account platforms. In contrast to their larger peers, smaller investors are drawn to large managers because of their established brands and ability to deliver across a broad range of alternatives asset classes.
Fourth, the alternative investment industry will remain fragmented and highly competitive for at least the next five years.
The competitive landscape in alternatives is still largely unformed. In stark contrast to traditional asset management, the alternatives market remains highly fragmented, with ample room for new category leaders to emerge. Within the hedge fund and private equity asset classes, for instance, the top five firms by global assets collectively captured less than 10 percent market share in 2012 - a far cry from the 50 percent share enjoyed by the top five firms competing in traditional fixed-income and large-cap equity. The alternatives market will likely remain highly competitive and support a greater diversity of players than the traditional asset-management market.
Fifth, as traditional asset firms increasingly enter the alternative investments space beyond 2020, the industry will begin to consolidate.
The mainstreaming of alternatives is already driving a convergence of traditional and alternative asset management within the $64 trillion wealth management industry. The two sides will increasingly battle for an overlapping set of client and product opportunities in the growing alternatives market. With the stakes so high, competition between traditional managers and alternatives specialists will only intensify. A wave of partnerships or joint ventures between traditional and alternatives firms (including funds of funds) is also possible, as smaller managers lacking scale and distribution heft seek to establish relevance in alternatives.
Sixth, over the long-term, many retail investors will outperform all but a tiny fraction of alternative investments using low-cost, systematic equity strategies.
When assessed objectively based on their track records, alternative investments make sense for many institutional investors and some retail investors for the reasons identified by McKinsey. However, they are not ideal for many high-net-worth individuals who could adopt low-overhead, self-managed strategies. Consider the fact that, from 2004 to 2013, those who invested in the Barclay Hedge Fund Index would have earned just 6.2 percent per year, compared with 7.4 percent for the S&P 500, 7.7 percent for Berkshire Hathaway, and 12.5 percent for the three Strategic Wealth Advisor strategies.3
References
1. McKinsey Quarterly, February 2015, "The $64 Trillion Question: Convergence in Asset Management," by Pooneh Baghai, Onur Erzan, and Ju-Hon Kwek. ¨Ï 2015 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved.
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/financial_services/the_64_trillion_question
2. iBid.
3. To learn more about the Strategic Wealth Advisor investment strategies, visit their website at: