Most of the weapons available to U.S. troops are not only extremely lethal, but cause widespread destruction. In some cases, such as at the beginning of the Iraq war, they are absolutely necessary and the only weapons of choice.
However, in other circumstances, such as after the regime of Saddam Hussein was brought to an end and the Iraqi army defeated, the aim is simply to secure the peace and start rebuilding.
At such a point, as explained in a February 2004 report from the Council on Foreign Relations, progress can be seriously hindered by a lack of non-lethal weapons. That’s why the CFR’s Independent Task Force on Non-Lethal Weapons and Capabilities report urged the Defense Department to increase spending in that area.
Obviously, even at this stage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, some lethal weapons are still needed to defend against insurgents and repel the random attacks that are still going on. But, in the broader effort, it would be more effective to avoid killing innocent by-standers and minimize destruction of buildings and other infrastructure.
Non-lethal weapons, or NLWs, embody a diverse array of devices meant to minimize fatalities and undesired damage to property and the environment. There are three classes of NLWs.
The first class of NLWs includes anti-personnel weapons to be used in crowd control: incapacitating agents to be used against individuals; area denial systems to keep people out of certain areas; and devices meant to clear people out of facilities, structures, or areas of operation.
The second class of non-lethal weapons includes devices or systems that will keep vehicles, vessels, or aircraft out of an area or disable them.
The third category includes systems that will disable facilities or systems that might be used in the deployment of weapons of mass destruction.
The range of non-lethal anti-personnel weapons has been growing for years. It now includes nets for entangling people or stopping vehicles, slippery spray for use on pavement, as well as rubber-ball projectiles, rubber pellets, and beanbags that can be fired to stun an enemy.
The Task Force pointed out that the use of such weapons ? and new ones that are just being developed ? could reduce the loss of life for peaceful citizens, protect infrastructure, and make the U.S. presence more acceptable to the local population.
For example, non-lethal weapons at checkpoints might have prevented the recent death of the Italian intelligence officer killed by friendly fire in a case of mistaken identity. The effectiveness of these weapons has already been demonstrated. In March 1995, the U.S. Marines, armed with non-lethal weapons, safeguarded the withdrawal of 2,500 U.N. peacekeepers from Somalia without a single fatality on either side.
Despite that success, NLWs haven’t entered the military mainstream. Why not? As it stands now, commanders are reluctant to request or use NLWs for lack of clear guidelines and known effects.
The same sense of uncertainty reigns above them, all the way to the top brass, who aren’t sure how to fund or procure them while avoiding their controversial nature. In other words, without some reforms in the way that research, development, and procurement are done in this area, it will remain simpler to kill someone than to try to use an NLW.
Another obstacle is that the military lacks the funding it would need to deploy NLWs on a large scale. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 designated the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the executive agent for joint research, development, testing, and evaluation of NLWs and non-lethal weapons technologies.
At present, there is a Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate with a 2004 budget of $43.4 million, nearly double what it has been in the past. But a recent Naval Task Force report claims that to put NLWs front and center in the military arsenal will take $300 million per year. And while that may seem like a lot, it’s less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the defense budget. Nevertheless, up until now, less than $1 million of the Joint Directorate’s budget has been used for the development of new technology.
It was largely in response to this state of affairs that the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate’sbudget was doubled for 2004 with a mandate to support experimentation, systems modeling and analysis, functional concept exploration programs, and advanced concept technology demonstrations, while handing off the job of new ideas for NLWs to the science and technology people.
At the same time, the critical job of making sure that weapons effects are properly understood now falls to the Directorate. This refocusing of the directorate away from non-lethal weapons development and toward acquisition allows it to address the critical limiting factor for widespread integration of NLWs: namely, the lack of a clear understanding of the effects and effectiveness of these weapons.
At the same time, the Office of Naval Research is launching widespread R&D efforts in NLWs for use in protecting seaports, as well as the prevention of attacks such as the one on the U.S.S. Cole. Once those research efforts pay off, the Department of the Navy will assume end-to-end responsibility for development, acquisition, and deployment of its own NLWs. These will include chemical weapons, directed energy weapons, barriers and entanglements, and underwater defensive systems.
The technology developed by the Navy and by the Directorate under the Marine Commandant, as well as by the other armed services, will then be spread throughout the military as uses and effects are verified. We aren’t privy to the classified research, but a review of some of the publicized projects provides a flavor of what can be done.
For example, at present, there are chemical weapons that can stop an approaching vehicle or incapacitate people inside or outside a vehicle without causing death. This has obvious applications when it comes to unidentified vehicles approaching checkpoints in Iraq.
Even before 9/11, the need for NLWs was evident in places where the military was faced with large crowds of people in which some people are innocent civilians but others may be terrorists or other enemies.
In the March 5, 2001, issue of the Marine Corps Times, for example, the Corps unveiled its Vehicle-Mounted Active Denial System, known as VMADS, developed jointly with the Air Force. The Defense Department spent nearly $40 million over 10 years to develop VMADS with primary contractor Raytheon Missile Systems.
VMADS is essentially a high-powered ? but not lethal ? microwave oven that can direct its beam at a distant target. In essence, it instantly heats up the moisture in or on a person’s skin and starts to cook it in the same way a microwave oven would. Used in short bursts, it’s extremely painful but non-lethal. If its beam is waved across a crowd, it causes intense pain in numerous people at once, causing confusion and driving the crowd away. The Marines planned to mount the VMADS on Humvees, while the Air Force was going to mount them on helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. But, so far that hasn’t happened.
In part, this is the result of military bureaucracy. But it’s also in part to a response to human rights critics. Numerous NLWs have been cancelled in the past due to public outcry about their effects being inhumane. In one instance, a non-lethal laser weapon carried the risk of causing blindness. Critics overlooked the fact that most people, if given a choice, would rather be blind than dead.
In the case of the VMADS, the microwaves penetrate the skin to a depth of only one-sixty-fourth of an inch and heat it to a temperature of just 130 degrees, which is not enough to cause serious burns in any event. In more than 6,000 human exposures done in tests, no one was seriously hurt. Nevertheless, the critics continue to object.
More recently, the March 2, 2005 issue of New Scientist described an even newer technology, known as Pulsed Energy Projectiles, which uses a laser that fires pulses of energy. When the electromagnetic radiation hits the skin, it turns into a plasma and causes pain and temporary paralysis.
In this case, pain researchers voiced objection to the technology, raising the possibility that it could be used for torture. While this is not likely to derail research, the heightened sensitivity to such matters is reflected in a decision by the two largest law enforcement agencies of the Department of Homeland Security to ban the use of stun guns because of their controversial nature.
However, stun guns are used by more than 7,000 law enforcement agencies across the country, according to USA Today. Ironically, the Department of Homeland Security will continue to use lethal weapons, along with riot batons and pepper spray.
In light of this trend, we offer the following six forecasts for your consideration:
First, as the war on terror continues, the U.S. military will find itself increasingly in situations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the enemy is difficult to identify among ordinary citizens. The use of lethal force, while necessary in some situations, will become impractical in these venues, making it mandatory for the military to integrate NLWs into its everyday arsenal.
Second, the political, institutional, and even monetary pieces of the puzzle will come into place for the widespread development of NLWs. Within the next few years, the pressures we’ve just mentioned are going to push these technologies into the field, where they are needed. For example, both VMADS and Pulsed Energy Projectiles are already available for at least limited use. We expect to start seeing them widely deployed and tested in real-life situations by 2009.
Third, as NLWs prove their effectiveness in the next five to 10 years, our troops will also enjoy increased security. They will be more willing to use weapons when they know they don’t have to risk killing an innocent person by mistake.
Fourth, both supply and demand pressures for the creation and distribution of NLWs will create a new market that will benefit not only large traditional defense contractors but small entrepreneurial firms as well. While NLWs will include high-tech microwaves and lasers, many of the most successful devices will be relatively low-tech, such as stink bombs, rubber bullets, and Kevlar nets that can catch a speeding car. Anyone who can come up with a good idea for a non-lethal weapon will have a shot at success, and venture capitalists will step in to exploit this hot growth area. This will lead to weapons that are more and more effective, and less and less harmful.
Fifth, the outcry against NLWs will become marginalized to the radical fringe. The respectable researchers who are now speaking out will begin to realize that these weapons will have a place on the battlefield and in clean-up operations such as Iraq. They will also see that NLWs are much more desirable than traditional lethal weapons because they result in far fewer collateral casualties.
Sixth, in the next 25 years, scientists who are just now learning how the human brain works will develop new technologies that will lead to even better non-lethal weapons. These new technologies will subdue individuals by temporarily deactivating certain parts of the nervous system, rendering adversaries helpless. In addition, new techniques developed through functional magnetic resonance imaging will allow military personnel to see patterns of malicious intent in someone’s brain at a distance, making it easier to distinguish friend from foe. This will lead to a whole new approach to non-lethal weapons that will allow troops to identify a single threatening adversary in a crowd of innocent civilians, and to stop the threat with virtually no harm at all.
References List : 1. To access the report “Non-Lethal Weapons and Capabilities,” visit the Council on Foreign Relations website at:www.cfr.org/pub6793/richard_l_garwin_graham_t_allison_paul_x_kelley/nonlethal_weapons_and_capabilities.php2. Marine Corps Times, March 5, 2001, “The People Zapper,” by C. Mark Brinkley. ⓒ Copyright 2001 by Military Times Media Group. All rights reserved.3. New Scientist, March 2, 2005, “Maximum Pain Is Aim of New U.S. Weapon,” by David Hambling. ⓒ Copyright 2005 by Reed Business Information Ltd. All rights reserved.4. USA Today, March 17, 2005, “Federal Bureaus Reject Stun Guns,” by Kevin Johnson. ⓒ Copyright 2005 by USA Today, a division of Gannett Co., Inc. All rights reserved.
